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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Fred E. Inbau
Expert Witness-False Representations as to Qualifications-Perjured Testimony
of Fingerprint "Expert"
One of the most flagrant and brazen acts
of perjury ever committed by an alleged
witness is recorded in a recent decision of
the Kentucky Supreme Court- Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 733, 134 S. W.
(2d) 653 (1939). In this case (a prosecution for murder) an "expert" by the
name of H. G. Coffey, who testified that
he had found the defendant's fingerprints
on a stone which had been used as a fatal
weapon and also on the shoes of the deceased, stated as the basis for his qualifications as an expert that he had studied
fingerprint identification at "Cook and
Evans University, Sunshine Avenue, Chicago, Ill.," that he had been "associated
with Earl Stevens, Superintendent of the
Police Identification Bureau in Detroit,"
and that he had also been "on the payroll
of the Michigan Secret Service Police,
Bovine Avenue, Detroit." The attorneys
for the defendant wrote letters to these
various persons and organizations, as well
as to others mentioned by the witness, and
all letters were returned unclaimed with
the exception of the one addressed to
Lieutenant Stevens who informed the attorneys that he had never heard of such
a person as Coffey. In view of these indications that the witness had misrepresented his qualifications (at the preliminary hearing in this case), the attorneys
for the defendant requested a continuance
of the defendant's trial so that they might
have an opportunity to further investigate
Coffey's qualifications before he should be
permitted to testify at the trial. This request was denied, and the witness was
permitted to testify at the trial. He then
reiterated the above-mentioned statements
as to his qualifications. The defendant was
convicted, but upon appeal the trial
court's decision was reversed because of
error committed by the trial court in not
granting a continuance for the purpose of
permitting defense counsel to make a fur-

ther investigation of the witness Coffey.
(In so deciding the appellate court found
that the defense counsel had not been lax
in their duty and had not had sufficient
opportunity to thoroughly investigate the
witness's alleged qualifications.)
This case represents the third recorded
instance where Mr. Coffey has misrepresented his qualifications. The first time
was in Ingram v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky.
323, 96 S. W. (2d) 1017 (1936), where the
witness stated that he had studied the
subject of fingerprinting for two years at
Northwestern University and also in the
Detroit Police Department for two and a
half years. In the Ingram case the defense
counsel failed to object to the witness's
qualifications in this respect, and upon appeal the court held that the objections
were untimely and therefore the trial
court's conviction was affirmed. The second recorded instance of Coffey's misrepresentations occurred in Green v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 475, 105 S. W. (2d)
585 (1937) (previously noted in this Journal in Vol. 28, No. 3, at p. 443). In this
case (a rape prosecution) Coffey alleged
that he found the defendant's fingerprints
on an empty cigarette package at the
scene of the crime, and here again Coffey
stated as proof of his qualifications that
he "had had instruction off and on" for
two and one half years at Northwestern
University. This time the defense counsel
obtained affidavits from the director of the
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory at
Northwestern University who reported
that there was no record of any man by
the name of this witness having attended
the Laboratory or the University for instruction and, furthermore, that no one on
the staff of the Laboratory recalled having
even talked to such a person by the name
of Coffey. But despite the information
contained in this deposition, the trial court
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refused to permit it to be read to the jury
for the reason that since the witness did
not state that he had been enrolled as a
student at the University but had merely
received instruction there "off and on,"

the deposition was in no sense contradictory to the witness's testimony. The same
view was taken by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in a decision affirming the trial
court's conviction.

Firearms Identification-Evidence and Testimony Regarding
Based Upon Shot Pattern Experiments

In the case of State v. Criger, 98 Pac.
(2d) 133 (Kans. 1940), in which the accused was being tried for the murder of
his wife, the trial court admitted in evidence the testimony of witnesses to the
results of experiments made for the purpose of approximating the distance at
which the deceased had been shot. The
accused admitted the shooting but stated
that it was accidental and that the fatal
shot was discharged as he was handling
his shotgun preparatory to going out
hunting. Since the results of the shot pattern experiments tended to refute the accused's testimony with regard to the distance of the firing, this evidence was of
considerable importance in the trial. In
the making of the experiments shells of
the same kind as the evidence shell were
used, and they were fired in the fatal
weapon from various distances at blotting
paper which served as the target material.
As stated in the appellate court's opinion,
the experimenters had "considerable experience" in the handling of firearms.
Upon appeal from a trial court conviction,
the defendant argued that the evidence
adduced from the shot pattern experiments was inadmissible because the experiments were not made under the

Firing Distance

supervision of the court or in the presence

of the defendant and were not shown to
have been made under conditions similar
to those under which the gun was fired
at the time of the fatal shooting. In answer to these objections the appellate
court in affirming the conviction made the
following statement: "Experiments of this
character frequently are made in homicide
cases, and uniforrhly received in evidence.
The purpose of the experiments in this
case was to determine the spread or pattern of the shot when the gun was fired
at various distances from the target. There
is no reason to think that the spread or
pattern of the shot would be different
when the gun was fired at the time of the
tragedy than when the experiments were
being made. We think there was no error
in the admission of this testimony. In
this connection it also was argued that it
was error for the court to admit in evidence the targets used in these experiments, which showed the spread orpattern
of the shot when the gun was fired at
various distances from the target. If the
testimony respecting these experiments
was competent there was no reason to exclude the targets."

Blood Grouping Statutes Recently Enacted In New Jersey, Ohio and Maine

Until recently only two states had enacted legislation regarding blood grouping
tests. These two were New York and Wisconsin. During 1939, however, the legislatures of New Jersey, Ohio, and Maine
also enacted statutes upon this subject.
For the interest of Journal readers the
statutes in these three states are reproduced herewith."
New Jersey. "An Act concerning evidence and witnesses, and supplementing
subtitle eleven, of Title 2, of the Revised
Statutes.
I For copies of the New Jersey and Ohio
statutes the Editor is indebted to Dr. Philip
Levine of Newark Beth Israel Hospital, New-

"Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
"Whenever it is relevant to the case of
the prosecution or the defense in a proceeding involving parentage of a child, the
trial court, by order, may direct that the
mother, her child, and the defendant submit to one or more blood grouping tests
to determine whether or not the defendant
can be excluded from the probability of
being the father of the child. The testimony of experts to the result of the test
shall be receivable in evidence, but only
ark,_ N. J.; and for the ones from Maine, to
Mr- George Wiener, Attorney-at-law, Brooklyn, N. Y.
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in cases where definite exclusion of parentage of the defendant is indicated. The
tests shall be made by duly qualified
physicians, to be appointed by the court.
Such experts shall be subject to cross examination by both parties after the court
has caused them to disclose their findings
to the court or to the court and jury.
Whenever the court orders such blood
grouping tests to be taken and one of the
persons thus directed shall refuse to submit to such tests, such fact shall be disclosed upon the trial in the discretion of
the court.
"Whenever it shall be relevant in a civil
action to determine the parentage or the
identity of any child or other person, the
court, by order, may direct that any party
to the action and the person whose parentage or identity is involved submit to
one or more blood grouping tests, to be
made by duly qualified physicians under
such restrictions and directions as the
court or judge shall deem proper. Whenever such test is ordered and made, the
testimony of the experts to the results
thereof, subject to cross examination as in
section one, shall be receivable in evidence, but only in cases where definite
exclusion is indicated. The order for such
blood grouping tests also may direct that
the testimony of such experts and of the
persons so to be examined be taken by
deposition. The court shall determine how
and by whom the costs of such examination shall be paid."
Ohio. "An Act to supplement section
12122 of the General Code by the enactment of supplemental sections 12122-1
and 12122-2, relative to paternity tests in
illegitimacy proceedings and in civil and
criminal actions generally.
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Ohio:
"Section 1. That section 12122 of the
General Code be supplemented by the enactment of supplemental sections 12122-1
and 12122-2 to read as follows:
"Section 12122-1. Whenever it shall be
relevant to the defense in a bastardy proceeding, the trial court on motion of the
defendant, shall order that the complainant, her child, and the defendant submit
to one or more blood-grouping tests to

determine whether or not the defendant
can be excluded as being the father of the
child. The tests shall be made by duly
qualified physicians or other qualified persons, not to exceed three, to be selected
by the court, and under such restrictions
and directions as the court or judge shall
deem proper. In cases where exclusion
is established the results of the tests together with the findings of the expert or
experts of the fact of non-paternity shall
be receivable in evidence. Such experts
shall be subject to cross-examination by
both parties after the court has caused
them to disclose their findings to the court
or to the court and jury. Whenever the
court orders such blood-grouping tests to
be taken and one of the parties shall refuse to submit to such tests, such fact
shall be disclosed upon the trial unless
good cause is shown to the contrary. In
the event such tests have been made prior
to the trial, the results thereof shall be
receivable in evidence. The court shall
determine how and by whom the costs of
such an examination shall be paid.
"Section 12122-2. Whenever it shall be
relevant in a civil or criminal action or
proceeding to determine the paternity or
identity of any person, the trial court on
motion, shall order any party to the action
and any person involved in the controversy or proceeding to submit to one or
more blood-grouping tests, to be made by
duly qualified physicians or other qualified persons not to exceed three, to be
selected by the court and under such restrictions or directions as the court or
judge shall deem proper. In cases where
exclusion is established the results of the
tests together with the findings of the expert or experts of the fact of non-paternity shall be receivable in evidence. Such
experts shall be subject to cross-examination by both parties after the court has
caused them to disclose their findings to
the court or to the court and jury. Whenever the court orders such blood-grouping
tests to be taken and one of the parties
shall refuse to submit to such tests, such
fact shall be -disclosed upon the trial unless good cause is shown to the contrary.
The court shall determine how and by
whom the costs of such examination shall
be paid."
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Maine. "An act permitting blood grouping"Be
tests in bastardy proceedings.
it enacted by the People
of the
State of Maine, as follows:
"R.S. c. 111, additional. Chapter I of
the revised statutes is hereby amended by
adding at the end thereof a new section,
to be numbered 12, and to read as follows:
"Sec. 12. Blood Grouping Tests. After
the return day, the Court in term or vacation, on motion of the respondent, shall
order the complainant, her child, and the
respondent, to submit to one or more
blood grouping tests to determine whether
or not the paternity of the respondent can
be excluded; the specimens for the purpose to be collected and the tests to be
made by duly qualified physicians and
under such restrictions as the court shall
direct, the expenses therefor to be audited
by the court and borne by the respondent.
The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence, but only in cases where
exclusion is established. The order for
such tests may also direct that the testimony of the examining physicians may be
taken by deposition."

With regard to legislative action in
other states during 1939, the following
communication from Mr. George Wiener
of Brooklyn, N. Y., is of interest:
"The State of Minnesota had two bills
introduced in 1939, by Mr. Erickson of the
House, being House File Nos. 84 and 85,
referred to Committee on Judiciary, and
reported favorably. Then sent to Senate
and also reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, but no
action was reached or taken thereon.
"A bill was likewise again (for the second time) introduced in California by
Assemblyman Redwine, this bill being
identical with section 306-A of the Civil
Practice Act of New York, but no action
was taken thereon for the reason that
other business occupied the attention of
the Legislature.
"Section 306-A of the Civil Practice Act
of New York was further amended in
1939, by chapter 647 of the Laws of 1939,
to have these tests ordered in any court
of record in the state."

Procedure and Practice with Regard to Blood Grouping tests under New York Statute

In the October 5, 1939, issue of the New
Jersey Law Journal there is an interesting
article by Mr. Sidney Schatkin and Dr.
Philip Levine entitled "Paternity Blood
Tests" in which a description is given of
the practice and procedure followed under
the New York statute. The New York law
states that the courts shall order blood
grouping tests to be made by a "duly
qualified physician," and it is with regard
to the appointment of such a physician
that an interesting and commendable practice and procedure has been developed in
New York City. There, according to the
authors of the article in the New Jersey
Law Journal, the Corporation Counsel's
Office is charged with the duty of handling all paternity determinations or bastardy proceedings. That office, in an effort to secure the proper kind of
testimony, has obtained from the New
York Academy of Medicine a list of physicians the Academy considers qualified to
make blood grouping tests. The only
physicians who conduct the blood grouping tests and who appear in the courts of

New York City are those selected from
this particular list. This, of course, is a
very desirable practice for it offers considerable assurance not only as to the
competency of the person making the test
but also as to his honesty and integrity.
The authors of this article also comment
upon certain precautions taken by New
York physicians in order to avoid the perpetration of frauds upon themselves. It
would be a relatively easy matter, of
course, for the parties to a suit of this
nature to send to the examining physician
some relative or friend with the proper
blood group to support their contention
one way or the other. To prevent such a
fraudulent' practice in New York, whenever a person presents himself to the appointed physician for the purpose of submitting to a blood grouping test, the physician takes the person's fingerprint and
signature if he or she happens to be one
of the adults, and if it be the infant a
footprint is taken. Then, at the time when
the physician appears in court to testify,
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similar identification data are obtained
from the parties appearing in court, and
in this way the physician can be certain
that in testifying as to the results of his

laboratory tests he is referring to the
proper parties and not to someone who
may have appeared in their place as substitutes.

A Recent Blood Grouping Decision under the Wisconsin Statute

The appreciation of the value of blood
grouping tests in paternity determinations
in the State of Wisconsin is indicated by
a recent Wisconsin decision. In this case,
Euclide v. State, 286 N. W. 3 ( Wis., 1939),
blood grouping tests had been made upon
the complaining witness, her child, and the
accused father, the results of which indicated that it was not possible for the accused to have been the father of the child
in question. Unfortunately, however, the
specific procedure outlined in the Wisconsin statute was not adhered to and the
blood grouping evidence was not admitted
at the trial. The Wisconsin statute provides that the tests shall be made by a
physician or duly qualified person appointed by the court. It so happened in
this particular case that the physician appointed by the court turned the blood
specimens over to the Wisconsin State

Toxicologist who, of course, would have
been qualified to testify had he been the
appointed party. Since the statutory procedure was not followed, however, the
court naturally refused to permit the
blood grouping testimony to be introduced. Although the results of the test
indicated the impossibility of the accused's
being the father of the child, a verdict
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Upon appeal the appellate court held that
in the interest of justice the case should be
reversed so that on subsequent trial the
court could have the benefit of the results
of the blood grouping tests. The appellate
court was here inclined to attach considerable significance to the blood grouping
evidence and apparently thought that if
such evidence had been available at the
trial a different verdict and a more just
one would have resulted.

A Recent Blood Grouping Decision from Ohio

Many experts will undoubtedly disagree with the decision of the Ohio Court
of Appeals in the recent decision of State
ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16,
24 N. E. (2d) 962 (1939), and yet it must
be conceded by all that the court's opinion is supported by some very sound reasoning.
The defendant in this case, a bastardy
proceeding, was adjudged to be the father
of the complainant's child, despite the fact
that a serologist testified in the defendant's behalf that the results of blood
grouping tests excluded the defendant as
the possible parent. Upon appeal the defendant contended that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, and that
the trial court erred in refusing to give
certain requested instructions regarding
the weight to be given to the expert's testimony as to the results of the blood
grouping tests. (According to the appellate court these instructions, if given,

would have permitted the jury to decide
the case upon that evidence alone.)
In affirming the trial court's decision it
was held that since absolute conclusiveness and infallibility of blood grouping
test results had not been definitely established, the court would not be justified in
ruling that the test results in this case
should nullify all the complainant's evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the
court very justifiably raises the point that
a ruling to that effect would also have to
presuppose absolute honesty and thorough competence on the part of the expert, and also the preclusion of all chances
of innocent mistakes. The appellate court
also stated that the requested ruling
would have placed the trial court in the
position of singling out the testimony of
a particular witness and commenting upon
it in violation of the established rule prohibiting the trial judge from expressing
his opinion as to the value and weight of
the evidence.

